4/5/2023 0 Comments Extremal zcash miner![]() ![]() ![]() This structure encourages both parties to come to a compromise over prioritising coinholders vs the broader public. Both parties build and maintain their own clients (realpolitik implementation of a plausible chainsplit) and there is a unique trademark agreement which acts as a legal equivalent (for a fork to be legally called Zcash, both parties have to be in agreement). Zcash completely forgoes coinholder voting, instead choosing to operate as a sort of two-party network state (where both parties receive in-protocol funding for four years at a time).Īt a high-level, one party (the Electric Coin Company) is more concerned with coinholders, while the other (the Zcash Foundation) is more concerned with public goods. Protocol communities are made up of diverse constituencies, many of which coinholder governance fail to represent. Optimising for private value capture is really quite awful from a standpoint of capital efficiency in public goods provisioning The governance design space is much richer than just coinholder voting Two things Cosmos can learn from Zcash 1. Resiliency means having many independent organisations funded, aligned, and committed to supporting a protocol: the fact that zcash has only two core teams (and that both these teams are under a single jurisdiction) makes it much more vulnerable to regulatory overreach than Cosmos. ![]() In particular, coinvoter led governance is more conducive to a corporate than a FOSS mindset.Ī defining value of crypto is the right to exit: in order to respect this right, forking needs to be made as easy as possible (at least along the technical and cultural dimensions)Ĭoinholders – as a constituency – need to feel heard and valued: if this ingredient is missing, a protocol will never kickstart the virtuous cycle of price → adoption → price → adoption… without kickstarting this cycle, a protocol might survive, but it will never flourish. The governance design space is much richer than just coinholder voting: protocol communities are made up of diverse constituencies, many of which coinholder governance fail to represent. Obtaining this synthesis is especially important in light of the new whitepaper While most are aware that a tokeonomics update will be proposed, few understand that this update allows us to rethink, from the ground up, how we go about governing the Hub. It is my belief that it is only by studying both extremes of coinholder representation that we can come to a fruitful synthesis. Zcash offers a particularly useful case study because the protocol operates under an opposite extreme to ours (rather than being all powerful, coinholders by-and-large feel powerless and ignored). One of the best ways to see how we can improve our governance is to study other protocols. Incentivise the formation of a non-US protocol funded team Move towards loosely-coupled (advisory) coin votes Appendix B: Zcash governance – three recommendations.How are the deciders chosen and kept accountable?.Resiliency means having many independent organisations funded, aligned, and committed to supporting a protocol Coinholders, as a constituency, need to feel heard and valued A defining value of crypto is the right to exit To self govern and to do so using new mechanisms that go well beyond shareholder value, corporate boards, and mere stake voting.īetter staking/governance systems with better representation beyond just linear coin holder power is one of the most urgent issues confronting PoS Thanks to Udit and Zooko for reading drafts of this ![]()
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